What is Liberal Nationalism?
Many people think loyalty to a nation and a belief in individual freedom pull in opposite directions. Liberal nationalism says they do not. It has an old branch and a new one. The old branch was a nineteenth century cause: peoples who wanted independence or unity, and who also wanted written constitutions, elected assemblies and free speech. The new branch is a body of political theory from the 1990s. Its authors claim that a common national identity creates the trust that democracy and welfare systems need. It differs from civic nationalism by openly valuing a given language, culture and history. It also sets firm liberal limits on what a nation may do.
Core beliefs
- Peoples have a right to govern themselves, ideally in a democracy.
- A common culture gives people the setting in which to make real choices.
- Feeling part of one nation builds trust, and trust supports fair sharing.
- Nationalist goals may never override individual rights or the rule of law.
- Minorities within a country must be treated fairly and protected.
- Every nation should accept that others have the same right to rule themselves.
History
Most historians start the story after the French Revolution, when liberals in Europe and Latin America began to ask for independence and constitutional rule at the same time. Giuseppe Mazzini started Young Italy in 1831 and pictured free nations living together as a family of peoples. The revolutions of 1848 brought similar demands from Germans, Italians and many peoples under Habsburg rule. Hungary rose under Lajos Kossuth, but Austrian and Russian forces crushed the revolt in 1849. John Stuart Mill wrote in 1861 that free institutions are hard to keep alive in a state of mixed nationalities. After 1918, self-determination guided the peace settlements. The 1990s brought a revival in book form. Yael Tamir wrote Liberal Nationalism (1993), David Miller wrote On Nationality (1995) and Will Kymlicka wrote Multicultural Citizenship (1995).
Variants
The old version was a political movement against empires and absolute kings. The modern one is a theory about what justice requires. Tamir treats nations mainly as cultural communities. Miller argues that national identity is what makes people willing to share wealth with strangers. Kymlicka defends special cultural rights for national minorities and Indigenous groups. A few writers use the approach for nations without a state of their own that want more self-rule, for example Quebec, Catalonia or Scotland.
Criticisms
Cosmopolitan critics say it gives moral weight to the accident of where someone is born, and can excuse tight border controls. Some liberals say a state that promotes one culture cannot treat all citizens neutrally. Nationalists on the right call it too weak and too willing to give way. Historians add that nineteenth century liberal nationalists often refused to others the rights they demanded for themselves, as the quarrels between peoples of the Habsburg lands in 1848 showed.
In practice
These ideas helped drive the making of Italy, the national movements of Central Europe and the new states drawn up after 1918. In today's politics they appear wherever democratic citizenship is combined with an official language, lessons in national history and public money for museums and theaters, and in fights over self-rule for nations inside larger states. On the 12 axes the profile leans Democratic on Authority and toward National identity on Culture, with mild scores on most other axes.